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1 
Introduction 
 
Since the third wave of democratization, coined by Samuel Huntington, began in the mid 
1970’s till the mid 90’s it was believed that democracy was generally on the rise. First with the 
fall of Francisco Franco’s authoritarian regime in Spain in 1975 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991 and of apartheid in South Africa it was believed that were was no longer an ideology that 
could compete with democracy as well as capitalism as the undisputed champions of the Cold 
War. Following the overthrow of the previous regimes the new government’s that emerged 
sought to solidify their commitment to democracy by creating constitutions that created system’s 
of checks and balances, that protected human rights, and mandated the independence of 
institutions meant to govern. The belief that these constitutions would enable the protection of 
liberal democracy has since been shattered however with the introduction of so called ‘illiberal 
democracies’ who still follow a capitalist model, but whose main political attribute is the 
accumulation of executive power through the democratic process, normally elections, whereby 
opposition parties are sidelined and the dominant political party begins to monopolize and erode 
the independence of institutions that were meant to be independent, namely the judicial system 
and the media. They have also sought, and in Hungary’s case succeeded, in amending their 
constitutions in order to legitimate their hold onto power and by making it difficult to change if 
they were to ever be voted out of office. The distortion of constitutions in order to favor one 
political party at the expense of all the others and to solidify their power represents a grave risk 
to liberal democracy as a whole.  
2 
This paper will focus on Hungary’s turn into one of these illiberal democracies and will 
be split up into four chapters. The first will be an overview of liberal democracy, what it is, why 
it is important, and in the role that constitutions have played in it’s development. There will also 
be a discussion of the threat liberal democracy now faces and how the rise of populism has 
affected this trend. The second chapter will focus on the specific case of Hungary in particular 
the role the transition played in the establishment of democracy and the creation of the 
institutions, including the constitution, that was in place from 1990-2010. The third chapter will 
focus on the rise of the Fidesz party and Viktor Orban during the 2002-2010 Socialist-Liberal led 
government’s. There will also be a discussion of Hungarian political and social culture in general 
and how that enabled Fidesz rise following successive government failures in the economic 
sphere.  The fourth chapter will deal with how the Hungarian government of Viktor Orban since 
2010 has been systematically taking control and solidifying his power over the various 
institutions of government including the judiciary, the parliament, as well his control over the 
press and civil society through amendments to the constitution that have eroded the previous 
multi-party liberal democratic system into a virtual one party state.  
The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the internal causes for Hungary’s turn away 
from liberal democracy and whether or not this slide towards illiberalism will be emulated by 
other countries in the region. An important lesson that can be learned from Hungary’s case is that 
liberal democracy is never guaranteed and that threats to it are inherent in a democracy, it should 
never be assumed that the people themselves will flock to democracy just for democracy’s sake. 
The legitimacy of an ideology rests primarily in the results it can deliver for a people as well how 
deeply imbedded that ideology is in the mindset of the population, if those results are not 
3 
forthcoming and if, in Hungary’s case, the values of the ideology have not been ingrained 
previously then looking to Hungary might give a better glimpse as to what can happen when 
institutions do not live up to their population’s expectations.   
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Chapter 1. Threats to Liberal Constitutional Democracy? 
 
Liberal constitutional democracy can best be described as having, “first, a democratic 
electoral system, most importantly periodic free and fair elections in which the modal adult can 
vote, the second comprises the liberal rights to speech and association that are closely linked to 
democracy in practice. Finally, a level integrity of law and legal institutions- that is, the rule of 
law- sufficient to allow democratic engagement without fear of coercion.”  Those attributes are 1
enshrined in a constitution that is created through a democratic process by representatives of the 
people, open to judicial review, and able to be amended through parliamentary procedures. In 
this form of government respect for individual rights is paramount as opposed to the rights of a 
certain demographic group or class. The independence of other institutions in the state such as 
the media and the school system are also very important since equal access to information is 
crucial for rival political parties to voice their opinions and school systems need to be free from a 
biased education that could be used as propaganda by a government.  
Liberal Constitutional Democracy has come under sustained attack recently by the rise of 
right wing populism. Populism can be described as “a thin centered ideology that considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure 
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
general will of the people”.  This brand of populism has been present in most countries, both in 2
1 Tom Ginsberg, Aziz Z. Huq, ​Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?: Defining and Tracking the Trajectory of 
Liberal Constitutional Democracy. ​(Oxford University Press, New York, 2018). Pg. 36 
2 Cristobal Kaltwasser, ​Explaining the Emergence of Populism in Europe and the America’s, ​(University of 
Kentucky, 2015) pg. 191 
5 
Europe and the America’s, with varying degrees of success depending on the social, cultural, and 
economic situations in each individual country. Although populism is apparent both on the left 
and the right, it is right wing populism that poses the greatest risk to liberal democracies due to 
their anti-pluralistic undertones they employ that seek to demonize one or several groups in 
society and through expulsion or marginalizing of that community to achieve a degree of social 
harmony. Parties such as Alternative for Germany, Jobbik in Hungary, and the National Front in 
France have achieved a remarkable degree of electoral success due to their opposition to Muslim 
migrants and attacks on supranational organizations such as the EU and UN who are seen to be 
run for bureaucrats in foreign capitals that are taking control of policy away from the nation 
state.  
Identity has been a crucial aspect to populists electoral success. Appealing to voters fears 
and anxieties of rapid social change can be very effective if government’s are seen to be 
incapable or unwilling to stop or slow the number of immigrants arriving in a country. Trump’s 
description of caravans coming from Central America as an ‘invasion’ are case in point. 
Likewise in Europe the invocation of a Christian identity by populist parties has been used to 
differentiate themselves from the mostly Muslim migrants arriving in large numbers since 2015. 
In Western Europe where church attendance has been steadily decreasing, especially among the 
youth, Christianity has been front and center in the populists platforms, “it is a matter of 
belonging not of believing, a way of defining “us” in relation to “them”. If “they” are Muslim 
then “we” the Europeans, must in some sense be Christian. The ongoing erosion of Christianity 
as a religion makes it easier to invoke Christianity as a cultural and civilizational identity, 
understood in terms of shared values that have little or nothing to do with religious doctrine or 
6 
ritual.”  Populists therefore paint Christianity as being under attack and that they alone can be the 3
shields to protect it from an encroaching enemy that seeks to undermine and destroy the 
civilization in which they live in. However due to the fact that it is seen more as an identity 
rather than a religion populists can twist the teachings of Christianity, which include welcoming 
strangers and goodwill towards men and being charitable, and use the word without invoking 
those practices.  
In several countries, including Denmark, Belgium, France and the Netherlands bans on 
Muslim face veils have had support from large segments of the population and been touted by 
populist parties as necessary in order to liberate women from an oppressive male society in their 
home countries. In 2017 The European Court of Human Rights upheld Belgium's ban on face 
veils, other countries in Europe have similarly followed suit with their own bans as a way of both 
protecting their secular identity and to appease the more conservative part of the population. 
Bans like this are indicative of a situation in which mainstream political parties in Europe are 
trying to co-opt issues that right wing populist parties have championed as an attempt to keep 
them from gaining more electoral success which could lead to them to potentially leading a 
government in the future. Figures like Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front in France, 
which has a history of anti-semitism, have attempted to portray themselves as the defenders of 
the Jewish people in France which are very outnumbered by the number of Muslim immigrants, 
Le Pen stated that she was the best protection Jewish people from the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism, a bold statement from a political party that was previously very anti-semitic 
3 Brubaker, Rogers, “The New Language of European Populism: Why “Civilization” is Replacing the 
Nation” ​Foreign Affairs, ​2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-12-06/new-language-european-populism 
7 
itself. Recent attacks by Muslim terrorists, including those targeting Jews, have only heightened 
the fear which populists like Le Pen have attempted to capitalize on. 
In Hungary Prime Minister Orban delivered a speech on the occasion of the 170th 
anniversary of the 1848 revolution in March of 2018, which celebrates when Hungary tried to 
gain its independence but was quashed by Russian troops, and laid out a similarly populist 
message, “The situation is that there are those who want to take our country from us. Not with a 
stroke of a pen, now they want us to voluntarily hand our country over to others. They want us to 
hand it over to foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and 
who do not respect our culture, our laws or are way of life: People who want to replace what is 
ours with what is theirs.”  Unlike in Western Europe where there is more of an open, secular 4
atmosphere that respects different cultures and is viewed as more tolerant of issues like 
homosexuality and abortion the post-communist countries of Central Europe, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, and Poland have more conservative views and view Christian culture as 
centered around the traditional family. The Church still has a significant degree of power and 
influence although attendance is similarly on the decline among the youth. Hungary is unique 
among the European countries in that it is the one country where the language spoken, 
Hungarian, cannot be understood by other Europeans. That commanility makes it even easier for 
populist parties to frame the arrival of Muslim immigrants as an “us” versus “them” scenario. It 
is a culturally homogenous country where the vast majority of people are Christian and white. So 
the notion of being the protector of Europe has a lot more credence there.  
4 Orban Viktor’s ceremonial speech on the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, March 
16, 2018 
8 
A further area in which right wing populist’s attempt to gain more popularity with the 
people is through attempting to cast themselves as destroying system’s that have been seen to 
have failed and to associate them as traitors who are unfit to lead a country. In the past typically 
periods of a high volume of corruption and decreased physical security can lead to the arrive of 
right wing populists who claim they can save the people from the failings of the previous regime. 
An example of this can be found with the election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil who was a little 
known politician from a far right political party who used the previous government’s engulfment 
in corruption scandals and low voter confidence in the governmental system to his advantage. He 
managed to be elected President even though he had previously denigrated female politicians and 
called for an end to homosexuality in the country. In Hungary trust was eroded after the Socialist 
prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsany was elected prime minister in 2006, the Socialists had led the 
government since 2002, he was caught on video addressing a party congress where he openly 
admitted that he lied to the people during the election about the state of the economy and the 
about the promises that the government could not fulfill.Even though his speech was meant to 
rouse his party’s members into action the frankness of his deception caused a large majority of 
the population to lose trust in his government and in the party he represented as well and played 
into the hands of Orban and his Fidesz party who utilized that speech to describe them as 
unpatriotic and illegitimate.  
That delegitimizing of the previous system is part of the populist playbook as they 
attempt to show that they alone have the right to lead the nation. In the same speech as the 170th 
anniversary of the 1848 revolution Orban said of the opposition parties against him, “Let’s not 
distract ourselves: we do not need to fight the anaemic little opposition parties, but an 
9 
international network which is organized into an empire. We are up against media outlets 
maintained by foreign concerns and domestic oligarchs, professional hired activists, 
troublemaking protest organisers, and NGOs financed by an international speculator, summed up 
and embodied in the name “George Soros”. “  By deliberately associating the opposition parties, 5
civil society activists, and the media as being subservient to an outside individual Orban is 
discrediting his opponents without even naming them. As with the immigration issue Orban is 
shown as the shield against those who would want to destabilize Hungary from within and has 
attempted to heighten the anxieties of the population into being mistrustful of outsiders intrusion 
into a uniquely Hungarian culture. By shifting blame away from themselves populists have tried 
to showcase their own innocence and to in a way exude weakness in the face of overwhelming 
odds against them.  
The resulting success of right wing populist parties in elections have had several 
outcomes in the political sphere. Where populist parties have garnered success in parliamentary 
races but do not have the numbers needed to form a government there has been a scramble by 
other political parties to keep them from being a part of ant governmental coalition. In Germany 
following the success of Alternative for Germany (AFD) in claiming nearly 13% of the vote the 
Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, the center left and center right parties 
respectively who suffered huge electoral losses, were forced to join into another grand coalition 
in order to deny AFD the ability to join in the government. Although this process succeeds in 
keeping right wing populists out of government in can be seen as playing into their hands as 
Jan-Werner Mueller points out in his book ​What is Populism?​, “ Less obviously, the fact that all 
5  Orban Viktor’s ceremonial speech on the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, March 
16, 2018 
 
10 
political actors other than the populists collude to exclude the latter immediately strengthens the 
credibility of populists claiming that the established parties are forming a “cartel”; populists 
delight in pointing out that their competitors are ultimately the same, despite their professed 
ideological differences which reinforces the sense that only the populists offer a genuine 
alternative.”   6
Similarly in Sweden in took 133 days following the parliamentary elections to actually 
create a government, in January 2019, which included both the Social Democratic and center 
right political parties that had very divergent political views. Not unlike Germany this was done 
in order to exclude the Sweden Democrats, who are a right wing anti-immigrant and populist 
party, from having any say in the making or joining of the agenda of the government. They had 
garnered 62 seats in a parliament with 349 members, which is a significant amount. A 
consequence of deals such as this one and the one in Germany could be to erode good 
governance and therefore to further erode trust in the mainstream political parties. Two parties 
who have had divergent ideologies and who have perhaps had acrimonious relationships with 
one another in the past cannot be expected to govern effectively without some serious 
disagreements. This also will lessen popularity among the voters who voted for those parties who 
are seen to be compromising on many of their core issues, like the Social Democrats in Sweden 
did. This could have the consequences of shifting voters away from center right and center left 
parties and more to the ideological extremes which will make it increasingly unlikely that future 
elections will lead to parties able to form stable governments without extensive and time 
consuming negotiations. That in turn might actually enables populists to potentially garner more 
6 Mueller, Jan-Werner, “What is Populism?”, (Penguin Books, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 
pg. 83 
11 
support in the end. Since populist parties are not in government they can point to any failures of 
the government on both sides of the political spectrum as opposed to if they were in actually in 
government where they would have to answer for any potential failures that might occur. 
When right wing populists have become leaders in governments often times, in the cases 
of Poland and Hungary especially, they have moved towards becoming illiberal democracies. 
Illiberal democracies have sought to erode the checks and balances system that liberal 
democracies operate under as well as to monopolize power in the hands of the state in an attempt 
to centralize power within their own party both to expedite governing but also to remove any 
obstacles to their power to prevent them being removed in the future. Those obstacles include the 
judiciary, parliament, and the media. That is to say that populists seek to be in control of any 
changes that may happen but do not want others to be making those changes. An example of this 
can be seen in Hungary where after winning a parliamentary majority in 2010 prime minister 
Viktor Orban changed parliamentary rules in order to amend the constitution in order for him to 
cement his and his party’s rule by taking power away from the constitutional court and sidelining 
the oppositional parties by utilizing his party’s ⅔’s majority in Parliament.  
The rise of of right wing populism and the establishment of illiberal democracies, 
especially in countries in post-communist Europe where democracy was until recently thought to 
have been relatively successful, points to the dissatisfaction and mistrust that many people in a 
given population feel towards their political elites, political parties and institutions. Partly this 
can be traced back to the pace of globalization that has often been celebrated as opening 
countries up to investment, new cultures, and increasing trade but has also disadvantaged other 
people, especially those in rural areas, who have been left out due to the movement of jobs to 
12 
lower wage countries by companies and businesses. Therefore, “It must be recognized that the 
pace of change can move too fast for society to digest. The ideas of destruction and creative 
disruption have been celebrated so much that it is easy to forget that they look very different to 
the people being disrupted.”  The failure of politicians to explain and more importantly to help 7
those who have been displaced due to globalization but also due to automation is one reason why 
populist politicians have been so successful in framing the negative aspects of the economic 
situation on immigrants. That is especially true in countries like Hungary and Poland where, “In 
societies without strong traditions of multiethnic groups or assimilation, it is easiest to organize 
support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines. Once an ethnic group is in power, it tends to 
exclude other ethnic groups.”  This is not only the case in post-communist countries, it is evident 8
with the election of Donald Trump and Brexit as well the recent success of the National Front in 
France and should be heeded as a call for traditional parties to become more responsive to the 
demands of their people in order to offset the appeal of right wing populist parties at the ballot 
box. Increasing polarization of political parties and rising inequality and falling living standards, 
especially in countries who were until recently were seeing sustained growth, like the United 
States, have damaged the image of liberal democracy as the only alternative to authoritarianism 
and dictatorship. The most important tool to combat the right wing populists therefore is to 
engage in compromise to uphold the welfare state and social security benefits that a population 
has come to expect as well as to raise living standards in countries where it has fallen in order to 
regain the trust of the population, in short good governance.  
7 Zakaria, Fareed. “Populism on the March: Why the West is in Trouble” ​Foreign Affairs, 
November/December 2016, pg. 15 
8 Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”. ​Foreign Affairs, ​Vol. 76. No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1997, pg. 
35 
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Chapter 2: The Case of Hungary: The Transition from Communism 
1989-1991. 
 
Before we begin the discussion of Hungary’s transition from communism it is important 
to understand a little of the history behind how Hungary became how it is today since it matters a 
great deal to how the current government of Viktor Orban frames his and his party’s policies and 
rhetoric. Hungary, which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian empire since 1867, joined 
World War I on the side of the Central Powers with Germany and the Ottoman Empire. 
Following the defeat of Germany the Austro-Hungarian Empire was split up into different 
countries by the allied powers. The Treaty of Trianon in 1920 split apart the Hungarian 
population, “Hungary’s 283,000 square kilometers was reduced to 93,000 square kilometers, its 
population dropped from 18.2 million to 7.6 million. In all 3,425,000 Magyars (Hungarians) 
including sizeable homogenous communities-found themselves separated from their motherland 
in territories given to the monarchy’s successor states.”  Those successor states included 9
Romania, Austria, then Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, and Ukraine. The 
separation of so many of the Hungarian people from Hungary has often been repeated as an 
example of external oppression by more powerful states, not uncommon in Hungarian history, 
and has been used in a way to justify not being dictated to and to portray Hungary has being 
victimized. Following the start of World War II Hungary allied itself with Germany yet still 
9 Molnar, Miklos. ​A Concise History of Hungary. (​Cambridge University Press. 2001. United Kingdom.) 
Pg. 262  
14 
managed to maintain a certain degree of autonomy until March 1944 when a Hungarian fascist 
movement called the Arrow Cross came to power, and with it a Nazi occupation force that 
departed hundreds of thousands of Jews, with the aid of the Hungarian military and the 
population, to concentration camps.  
The defeat of Germany brought about the introduction of Soviet rule which lasted openly 
from 1948-1989. The Revolution of 1956, one of the most widely celebrated since many 
Hungarians are still alive who lived and fought in it, is used by politicians as well as an example 
of Hungarian resistance to outside rule. The revolution was brutally crushed and the leaders were 
put on show trials and hung, including the then prime minister Imre Nagy. Following the failure 
of the uprising and the re-imposition of Soviet domination in Hungarian affairs under the rule of 
Janos Kadar, who was chosen by Moscow to be in charge, there began a softening of communist 
rule. This softening was referred as goulash communism which was an understanding that the 
government would avoid the harsh measures it had imposed on the population before 1956 and 
provide a reasonable standard of living in exchange for the population’s acquiescence under 
communist rule and the giving up of their political rights. This situation remained in place 
throughout the remainder of the communist era until the beginning of the transition in 1989. 
The reasons for the collapse of communism had a great deal to do with the defeat of the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War. As Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reforms were hurting the 
Soviet economy it was becoming increasingly difficult for them to give money to their Soviet 
client states and it was increasingly unlikely that the Soviet Union would intervene militarily in 
Hungary’s internal affairs. In Hungary itself there were several reasons including “the impact of 
the 1956 revolution, the diminishing performance of the economy, the exhaustion of the regime’s 
15 
social services, disintegration of ideology, and a willingness to compromise on the part of both 
the new and the old elite.”  Two highly symbolic events are considered to show the end of 10
communist rule. One was the reburial of Imre Nagy, the communist prime minister who had died 
at the hands of the Soviet Union when he tried to steer on Hungary away from the Soviet’s form 
of communism. His re-burial was attended by a quarter million people, the fact that the 
communist authorities had allowed it when before the 1956 revolution was considered a 
counter-revolutionary assault on Hungary was a sign that the communist rulers could see the 
writing on the wall. The other event was the destruction of the border fence with Austria to allow 
East Germans to cross into West Germany, getting rid of their Iron Curtain.  
2.1 Hungarian Round Table Talks 
The last elections that occurred during the pre-transition era had been in 1985 and with 
the beginning of the discussions between the opposition and the communist party it was decided 
that the current parliament lacked the legitimacy to continue to rule. Therefore the parties had to 
come to an agreement on what the new institutions would look like and how they would operate. 
The communist party, known as the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) before it’s 
dissolution to form the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) had two competing wings, the reform 
minded politicians who realized that it was necessary to undergo a degree of change in order to 
be more electorally successful and the more hardline members who wanted to hold on to more of 
its power. The reform communists “Also wanted to hang out to power in the new system, firstly 
with the help of Pozsgay as President, and later, as members of a government coalition with their 
10 Bozoki, Andras. ​The Roundtable Talks of 1989 The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy. ​(Central 
European University Press. Budapest, Hungary. 2002) pg. 19 
16 
radically transformed party.”  Imre Pozsgay, a reform communist and one of the more well 11
known politicians in the country due to the lack of any other political parties at the time sought to 
keep the communist party in control through utilizing an alliance with some of the parties of the 
opposition in order to form a qualifying parliamentary majority. To that end they sought to split 
the opposition alliance in order to force the other political parties to bend to their demands to 
facilitate a speedy transition. The belief was a lack of political loyalty on the part of the 
population and the socialist party’s great advantage in organization that they would be able to 
prevail in the elections. However the opposition parties had agreed beforehand to not negotiate 
separately with the communists in order not to give them the upper hand in the negotiations. 
The major parties in the Round Table Discussions, the name given to the talks that 
between June-September 1989 decided upon the makeup of the democratic institutions and led 
the transition away from communism, included parties that had no history in Hungary before the 
roundtable discussions. There were others who had been formed post World War II, the so called 
historical parties, such as the Independent Smallholders Party (ISP), the Christian Democrat 
People’s Party, and the Hungarian People’s Party. These political parties represented a threat to 
the newer parties since it was thought that due to their name recognition, and their hostility and 
resistance to the communist party in the past that they would draw more votes. The other 
political parties included the Hungarian Democratic Forum which “began as an organization of 
populist writers and intellectuals critical of the Kadar regime’s management of the economy and 
its hands off approach to the mistreatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The MDF 
(Hungarian Democratic Forum) owed its existence in no small part to the tacit support of the 
11 Bozoki, ​The Roundtable Talks, pg. 27 
17 
reformist wing of the MSZMP, whose leader, Imre Pozsgay, attended the founding meeting of 
the MDF in Lakitelek in September 1987.”  This political party was more center right in its 12
ideology and was more nationalistic. Since they had been closer to the MSZMP it was with this 
party that the communist’s sought an alliance with. The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) 
had a more leftists ideology, its membership made up mainly with intellectuals and academics. 
The Alliance of Young Democrats (AYD), Fidesz, of which Viktor Orban was a member had a 
leadership that was based primarily with university students. One of the main differences 
between these two was that “The leading Free Democrat politicians were overwhelmingly left 
wing intellectuals-philosophers, sociologists, economists, who had broken with Marxism and 
often came from ex-communist, bourgeois, sometimes Jewish families. They were well read, 
open to the world and fluent in foreign languages, in contrast to the first generation of Fidesz 
intellectuals, who were mostly from a rural or small town background.”   The AYD was also 13
one of the more outspoken parties that called for no collaboration with the reformist wing of the 
communist party in order not to concede anything. The growing resentment that some members 
of Fidesz felt towards the AFD leadership, about a certain degree of elite membership, would 
come to matter more as time went on. For now though these political parties were united in a 
desire to bring about a democratic transition as well as to remove Russian soldiers from 
Hungarian soil.  
One of the major sticking points that resulted from the Round Table Discussions included 
the ways in which the President of the Republic should elected and what powers they should 
12 Bartlett, L. David. ​The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform and Democratization 
in Hungary. ​(University of Michigan Press. 1997. Pg. 148) 
13 Lendvai, Paul. ​Orban: Europe’s New Strongman. ​( C. Hurst and Company Publishers Ltd, London, 
2017, pg. 28) 
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have. The HSWP wanted to hold the presidential elections before the election of the president by 
popular vote while the opposition, particularly the AYD and AFD wanted the elections to be held 
after the parliamentary elections. The reasoning of the HSWP was that if Imre Pozsgay ran for 
the Presidency that he would win due to the better organizing capabilities and name recognition 
before any other candidates could truly develop their campaigns. Initially the Opposition 
Roundtable agreed to the HSWP proposal provided that the direct election of the president would 
only happen once and after that would be decided by parliament. The MDF, led by a man named 
Jozsef Antall, pushed strongly for this proposal. The AYD and AFD however strongly opposed 
this since they feared losing to the revamped socialist party. They therefore pushed for a 
referendum, to be held on November 26 November 1989, which was to ask the people several 
questions, “These included: 
1. Should the HSWP’s (party activity) in work places be banned? 
2. Should the Workers militia be dissolved? 
3. Should the HSWP’s party property be liquidated? 
4. Should the Presidential be held after the Parliamentary election?”  14
 
The AFD and AYD lobbied for the people to vote for yes’s to all of the questions while 
the HSWP, now referred to as the HSP lobbied for three yes’s and one no. Ultimately the vast 
majority, over 90%, voted for the first three questions but the last question only passed with a 
0.2% majority. Still this succeeded in denying the communists a further hold on to power and 
prevented them from occupying the office of the President.  
14 Kim. ​The Transition to Democracy in Hungary. ​Pgs. 93-94 
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The results of the first parliamentary elections of 1990, with 386 seats and a minimum 
threshold of over 5% to attain representation brought the HDF, the center right nationalist 
political party, to power along with its leader Joszef Antall. The full results are shown below: 
 
HUNGARY 
Parliamentary Chamber: Orszaggyules 
ELECTIONS HELD IN 1990 
 
Distribution of seats  15   
Political Group Total   
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) 165   
Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) 92   
Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) 43   
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 33   
League of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) 21   
Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) 21   
Independents 6   
Others 5   
 
One of the main issues that the Opposition Roundtable worried about when it came to 
electoral law was the inability of the parties to come together and form majority coalitions that 
would facilitate a stable government. That was deemed crucial as the rapid and monumental 
changes to the economic system would require consensus on a wide variety of issues. It would 
also inspire confidence in foreign investors, foreign governments, and in their own people. In 
order to make sure that they wouldn’t be an issue, “the framers opted for an election law that put 
15 ​http://archive.ipu.org/parline/reports/arc/2141_90.htm 
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its thumb on the scale in favor of larger parties-effectively using extra seat bonuses as a means of 
ensuring stable government.”  Although in the short term this allowed for political parties with 16
similar ideologies to come and form coalitions, this same electoral law with it’s ⅔ majority 
needed to pass legislation, is what Viktor Orban used when he came to power in 2010 and used it 
in order to radically alter the constitution and expand his party’s power.  
Antall decided, following his election victory, to form an alliance with two of the 
historical parties the Christian Democratic People’s Party and the Independent Smallholders 
Party. That enabled him to have a majority in the parliament. However due to legislative rules 
regarding the necessity of a ⅔’s majority needed to pass legislation Antall formed a political pact 
with the Alliance of Free Democrats. Part of this had to do with the fact that even though they 
had different political ideologies that there was simply no alternative to a technocratic, liberal 
democratic model that encouraged consensus which at the time was seen to be on the rise. 
Having a stable transition away from a command economy to a market economy was seen as 
crucial to economic growth which also meant that there would need to be agreement with most 
of the political parties. 
2.2 Powers of the President of the Hungarian Republic 
The Presidency of the Republic of Hungary went to Arpad Goncz, a member of 
the Free Democrats, who had previously fought in the 1956 revolution and been jailed under the 
Kadarist regime before being released in 1963. The Constitution of 1989 provided that “the Head 
of State of Hungary is the President of the Republic, who expresses the unity of the nation and 
16 Banukti, Miklos. “​The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to Illiberal Democracy: Hungary’s Illiberal 
Turn: Disabling the Constitution”, ​(Central European University Press. 2015, pg. 37) 
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who safeguards the democratic operation of the organs of the state.”  This meant practically that 17
the office of the President was meant to be more ceremonial and that the real power in the 
country was vested with the parliament and the Prime Minister. This was due to the fact that the 
Parliament was the branch of government that had the most direct contact with the people. The 
President was further weakened by the fact that almost all of his decisions needed the 
co-signature of the Prime Minister. One of the few areas where the President could influence 
legislation, rather than just being a moral voice, is when he can refer issues related to the 
constitutionality of a particular piece of legislation to the constitutional court for review. Even in 
those circumstances when Goncz did do that however his options were still limited as “ In the 
event that the Court finds the legislation is unconstitutional, the president returns it to Parliament. 
In the opposite case-if the Court upholds the legality of legislation-the president must sign the 
contested legislation into law and promulgate it within five days.”  So even if the President was 18
trying to act as a check on the legislative branch of government, the real authority on the matter 
was the constitutional court, and in the event of a ruling that went against his beliefs he would 
have to pass the legislation anyway. The President was also not directly elected by the people 
and instead was chosen by parliament for a term of five years. Although there needed to be a 
supermajority in order to elect the President if in fact a party succeeded in gaining that amount it 
would be in a position to place a loyalist in place and guarantee smooth passage of legislation.  
One of the first acts that Goncz did as President was attempt to showcase the powers he 
did have and to act in the interests of the ‘unity of the nation’ as prescribed in the constitution. In 
17 Pogany, Istvan. “Constitutional Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary’s Transition to 
Democracy”. ​The International and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol 42. No.2, April 1993) ​Cambridge 
University Press. Pg. 343 
18  Dae Soon Kim. ​The Transition to Democracy in Hungary.​(Routledge Press, Oxfordshire, 2013)​ ​Pg. 106 
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the summer of 1990 as the government stopped subsidizing petrol prices the price was now made 
by the international market. That led to an increase of 65 percent to the price of petrol and led to 
a strike by taxi drivers in order to force the government to reconsider. Initially prime minister 
Antall and the government were steadfast and refused to give in but Goncz in his role as 
declared, “In a letter sent to the ministry of interior, made his position clear, stating that, as 
commander in chief, he would not allow the forces of public order to be employed in order to 
tackle the crisis. Additionally, on the same day, in a televised public statement, he called on the 
government to enter into negotiations with the protestors.”  This put the government and 19
especially the prime minister in an awkward position since it put him at odds with the head of 
state who is suppose to collaborate with him. In order to avoid a collision the government 
acquiesced to the protesters demands and lowered the increase but not to the price where it was 
before. This was a victory for Goncz as he showcased his ability not to be sidelined and used as a 
as a rubber stamp for the government, Goncz believed that he was meant to act as one of the 
checks on governmental overreach. 
The President’s signature was also required in the removal or dismissal of high level 
governmental officials. During the summer of 1991 Prime Minister Antall decided that he was 
going to replace the vice presidents of the state media with people whom Goncz viewed as more 
pro-government than the previous office holders. Goncz refused to give his signature to their 
replacement and a standoff ensued whereby the President’s powers were curtailed even further. 
The constitutional court ruled that the president can only block nominees, “If there are sound 
reasons for concluding that the implementation of the recommendations would gravely disturb 
19  Kim, ​The Transition to Democracy in Hungary, ​Pg. 111 
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‘the democratic operation of the state organisation’. However, in the absence of such exceptional 
circumstance, it may be inferred that the President cannot block the Prime Minister’s 
nominations.”  The Court further ruled that, “The President of the Republic must exercise his 20
authority to make appointments within a reasonable date of submission; he must either sign the 
certificate of appointment, or decide to reject the nomination.”  This was done in order to limit 21
the ability of the President to delay signing the Prime Minister’s nominees indefinitely and to 
choose either to oppose them or to accept them. Although this ruling was meant to increase the 
functionality of the government by being able to replace and fire individuals it deemed unfit for 
service they did severely curtail the powers of the Presidency.  
2.3 The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
The previous infighting between the President and Prime Minister not only highlighted 
the difference of opinion and political ideology of the two leaders but also heightened the power 
of the constitutional court. The court had a very wide purview and, “not only had the power to 
nullify any unconstitutional law upon request, but it had the power to review any law for it’s 
constitutionality at multiple stages of the legislative process. Once a law was enacted, ​anyone 
could challenge the constitutionality in the abstract proceeding, which meant that virtually all 
major laws were reviewed by the Constitutional Court.”  The members of the court were also 22
chosen in a way that opposition parties would still have a voice in their nominations as a way to 
counteract the fact that in Hungary the unicameral legislature put most of the power in that body. 
The nomination process required that nominees gain a majority vote on by a committee where 
20 Istvan, “Constitutional Reform in Central and Eastern Europe”, Pg. 344 
21 Istvan, “Constitutional Reform in Central and Eastern Europe”, Pg. 344 
22 Toth, Gabor Attila, ​“Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law”, ​(Central 
European University Press, New York, USA, 2012) Pg. 243 
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each party, regardless of size of their political faction, be given one vote and then being elected 
by a ⅔’s majority. This was done with the expectation that due to the ⅔’s necessity it would be 
impossible for government to just stack the court with those who shared their ideological views. 
A major flaw in this system was that there wasn’t sufficient safeguards against a political party 
or parties who gained that majority and would simply utilize their votes to push through there 
candidates. A large aspect of this system was based on the presumption that the consensualist, 
compromise attitude would endure within the political establishment. Although this acted as a 
virtual check to the powers of the legislative branch it also meant that at times the view of the 
people through the legislature was not followed through on. For example, “Between 1990-1993, 
the Constitutional Court annulled 35 percent of the normative acts it reviewed that were passed 
before May 1990 and 31 percent of the normative acts it reviewed that were passed after May 
1990.”  To an extent this was to be expected, especially in a newly formed democracy where 23
laws and regulations, up until that point decided upon by a centrally controlled party apparatus, 
were now being opened up to change. However this did provoke the ire of the political parties, 
especially those in power at the time, and led to charges that they were still members of the old 
communist class. This idea was further solidified when in 1990 the court ruled against a 
legislative programme that would have taken land back from agricultural cooperatives, that were 
utilized by the former communist rulers as a tool through which to control the population and 
increase agricultural output, and give it back to the original inhabitants or their descendents as a 
way of righting the wrongs of the former system and of placading their electoral allies. The court 
ruled against the government saying it would be discriminatory to reprivatize the land to their 
23 ​The Constitutional Court of Hungary ​(Budapest: Constitutional Court, 1996) 
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previous owners while not doing the same to other forms of property that were stolen during the 
communist era. The Court’s ruling solidified it’s opposition against any forms of discrimination, 
even if they were supported by the voters and the government. Istvan Csurka, a former vice 
president of the MDF stated on the constitutional court “The Constitution does not permit the 
granting of preferential treatment to Hungarian peasants. Of course, even the blind can see, feel, 
comprehend that such treatment is just and necessary. But because a few judges think that this 
would infringe the Constitution it cannot be done. The question is, will the majority of the 
Government be capable of sticking to the path of legality and of constitutionality, or will the 
Constitutional Court force them off the rails?”  This differentiation that he is making, between 24
the government on one side represented the people in the form of the peasants and the courts 
who in his mind are acting against their interests is one of the first cases of populist rhetoric 
against the institutions of the post-communist era. The fact that following the introduction of 
democracy there were no trials for those communist era officials who could have been brought to 
court, an economic recession that saw unemployment increase and wages go down and some of 
the old elites still retaining control over their homes and in some cases still being in 
governmental positions in the civil service meant that there was resentment over what the 
population saw as just a transfer of some elites out of power and new elites into it. The 
Constitutional Court, although acting in accordance with their duties to uphold the constitution in 
an objective way, through their early ruling’s opened the door to accusations that they were 
against change.  
2.4 The Re-Making of the Hungarian Constitution 
24 Heiti Vilaggazdasag, 21 March, 1992, pg. 76 
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One of the most contentious issues related to the development of the post-communist 
democratic institutions was the restoration of the constitution from 1949 that was made during 
the Stalinist era by during the roundtable talks and the ensuing agreement with the HSWP. The 
reason why they decided to go this route was “they felt they did not have enough legitimacy to 
make the final arrangements to the democratic polity. A series of modifications to the old 
constitution (only some sentences were preserved of the original text) seemed the best way to 
guarantee the democratic transition without constraining the freedom of action of the future 
democratic legislation.”  Once elections were held it was the belief that the political parties, who 25
were democratically elected, would come together and decide on a new constitution. The ⅔’s 
majority needed to pass legislation was found in this document, as was the necessity for the same 
number necessary to amend the constitution, later expanded to ⅘’s of the legislature in 1995. This 
was done to ensure that smaller parties would be represented and that the vast majority of the 
population would have a say in the wording of the text. The preamble to the constitutionally 
testified to it’s transitory nature, it said “For the sake of promoting the peaceful transition into 
state of the rule of law that would realize political pluralism, parliamentary democracy, and 
social market economy, the parliament established the text of the Constitution of the Hungarian 
Republic as follows.”  26
 During the ensuing negotiations the government embarked upon a consensualist 
constitution making enterprise, where working with the opposition as well as with constitutional 
lawyers and experts it was believed that they could come up with a document that could be 
25 Szules, Gabor Zoltan. ​“Thinking Through Transition: The Abortion of a “Conservative” 
Constitution-Making: A Discourse Analysis of the 1994-1998 Failed Hungarian Constitution-making 
Enterprise.​ (Central European University Press, 2015, pgs. 238-239) 
26 1989 Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
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agreed to by all parties and be accepted by a majority of the population. Due to political 
infighting and a deteriorating relationship between the different parties during the 1994-1998 
legislative session where a socialist-liberal government had been in power, specifically between 
Fidesz and the Socialist/SZDSZ alliance no draft of a new constitution came to pass. In 1998 
when a Fidesz led right wing coalition came to power the constitution making process ground to 
a halt due partly to the fact that the “rhetoric of Fidesz from the early 1990’s to now always 
emphasized the insurmountable differences between the Hungarian Left and Right, it also 
presented parliamentary elections as an ultimate choice between two worlds, past and future, 
(post-) communists and patriots” . This more confrontational and adversarial attitude 27
characterizes the way Fidesz continues to act today which is against compromise and the 
consensualist politics that was around during the first decade of the post-communist political era. 
The failure to come to create a new constitution during the 1994-1998 period was that Fidesz 
could now use that as a way of painting the current constitution, with its protections for human 
and civil rights, as a continuation of the communist past even though it bore little resemblance to 
the initial document written in 1949. 
 
2.4 Social Aspects of the Transition to Democracy 
The transition that occurred in Hungary during these few years was important not only 
because of the way institutions changed but who was instituting that change. Unlike in Poland 
and the then Czechoslovakia there was no mass movement or political figures that led protests 
and inspired individuals to take to the streets to demand change. Figures like Lech Walesa and 
27 Szules, ​“Thinking Through Transition”, ​Pg. 249 
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Vaclav Havel did not exist as there were no mass movements that advocated for such radical 
change. Imre Pozsgay, the reform communist politician who was popular with the population for 
advocating for the change of the label of the 1956 revolution from a counterrevolution to a 
popular uprising and for advocating for the opposition roundtable talks, was still associated with 
the communist past and therefore could not be used as a suitable figure for a break from the 
system. This was an elite led transition where the people at the top of the communist party 
structure understood that there legitimacy had fallen apart and therefore accepted the inevitability 
of democratic change as they saw the communist system falling apart in countries surrounding 
them. The reasons for this relative passivity however were mostly economic, “Society never 
considered the communist system to be legitimate, but tolerated it as long as it succeeded 
economically. When the economic successes ran out, so did public tolerance, and the Communist 
leadership class soon found itself badly undercut.”  The fact that society equated economic 28
success to political success meant that the new government coming into power would be at a 
severe disadvantage at the outset due to the radical changes that would have to be implemented 
in order to move from a state run command economy to a market economy. Therefore, “only 
leaders who can demonstrate or convincingly promise immediate success can count on 
popularity. There are no reserves of confidence. The parties and their leaders are at the mercy of 
an ever impatient public opinion.”  The fact there was not the same sense of solidarity due to the 29
majority of the populations lack of involvement in the political transition and not knowing and 
therefore not having as much confidence in the new political parties emerging meant there was 
even going to be a short window for politicians to prove themselves. That was going to put 
28 Kis, Janos. “Post Communist Politics in Hungary”. ​Journal of Democracy. ​Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1991. 
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press. Pg. 4  
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liberal democracy to the test as most Hungarians associated liberal democracy with economic 
success and valued it more than political pluralism. 
The economic jolt that occurred following the transition cannot be overstated. The “major 
corollaries of economic restructuring were declining output (in Hungary’s case about 20 percent 
of the GDP between 1989 and 1994), declining incomes (about 8-10 percent in real incomes 
between 1990-1994), and pronounced shifts in the occupational structure.”  The fact that the 30
state could no longer afford to be one of the main employers of individuals, especially in the 
more rural areas, came as a negative shock. One aspect of this shock was that it was precipitated 
by the economic mismanagement of the communist rulers that had brought the country into more 
indebtedness and had overblown the state budget, a large part of it on the pension system.  As 
inflation and unemployment went up the changes “were simply blamed upon the new regime by 
a significant part of society, without recognition of the fact that the economic difficulties were 
not triggered by democracy the market economy, but actually these problems had actually led to 
the change of the regime.”   The economic changes also brought about winners and losers of the 31
new system. The majority of the winners, who benefited from an expanded private economy, 
were those who were the most highly educated and were mainly located in the urban centers. The 
losers were mainly those semi-skilled and unskilled workers from more rural areas who had 
benefited from the communist era guarantees of employment but who had to be let go when the 
privatization of industries began.These changes expanded the inequality gap that had been 
ongoing but that the sudden jolt from the transition exacerbated greatly. Who the transition 
30 Tokes, Rudolf. “Political Transition and Social Transformation in Hungary”. ​Revista CIDOB d’Afers 
Internacionals, ​No. 34/35. 1996. CIDOB. Pg. 88 
31 Magyar, Balint. ​“Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary”, ​(Central European University 
Press. 2016. Pg. 25) 
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benefited, the highly educated, mostly younger, urban dwellers is who the SZDSZ party mostly 
represented as they were the political party formed from the intelligentsia and academia. They 
were also for more pro-European integration which at the time of the transition from communism 
most of the political parties were in favor of and viewed as essential. However as time went on 
and the initial consensual approach to politics went away it was Fidesz and the right wing parties 
who began to utilize this divide in order to their advantage by claiming that the left wing parties 
weren’t looking out for the benefits of the Hungarian people. The introduction of multinational 
companies into Hungary now that the country had opened up to privatization and was getting rid 
of state owned property caused a backlash as well from people who felt like the new rulers did 
not sufficiently represent their interests and were selling out to foreigners. That, combined with 
ruling’s from the constitutional court that went against the redistribution of property to peasants 
among other cases that prevented the legislature from passing bills, as well as the lack of 
accountability on communist era officials bread a resentment that would be exploited by Fidesz 
and Orban, who assumed control over the party in 1993, in their populist message that sought to 
blame all of the country’s ills on traitors and elites who had sold the country out.  
To the point about a lack of interest in politics that was characterized by a low 
political party affiliation. That was due in part by the emergence of political parties that did not 
necessarily have the organizational infrastructure to campaign right away but it was also due to 
the fact that since the second world war the communist party had been such a dominant force in 
society and had been involved intimately in people’s lives that there was deep seated resentment 
about joining political parties again. The corrupt nature of the communist system, beginning 
especially during the limited economic liberalization of the country which began in the 1960’s, 
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had furthermore bread what has been called the dual value system which is, “an incentive not for 
the adherence to the official rules of the law and the state, but for their violation and evasion. The 
dual value system involves not only the breach of norms and corruption that leaks into public 
office, but also ​political cynicism​ and alienation from the political community.”  This creation 32
of a sort of second economy brought about more of an individualistic attitude among the 
population due to the severe mistrust they had of the system where in fact people tried their best 
to work around it for greater material gain. This goulash communism where the population 
feigned ritual support for the communist party was able to sustain itself due to a lack of a truly 
brutal nature on the part of Janos Kadar's regime and relative economic sustainability. It also 
made evident that, “The high levels of individualism and atomization, the weakness of solidarity, 
the alienation from the political community and the political cynicism- the ​pessimistic mentality 
is, for example, a feature of the Hungarian character that has been observed and described for 
more than a century.”  This pessimism is not only rooted in the lack of legitimacy that the 33
population had for the communist party but was rooted in long standing grievances in the 
sorrowful nature of Hungary’s past. The very high degrees of individualism within society meant 
that people relied more on their family and turned inward since organizations outside of the 
family, such as civil society groups, were controlled by the communist party so people were 
naturally distrustful of them.  The population’s support for political parties and in the system 
itself therefore was weak, even though the vast majority supported the idea of liberal democracy 
it was more for economic reasons. These feeling’s have mostly persisted as the first 
32 Korosenyi. “​Government and Politics in Hungary”, ​Pgs. 13-14 
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democratically elected parliament couldn’t deliver rapid economic growth in a short period of 
time and fed into this belief that the institutions couldn’t be trusted.  
The roots of the current right wing populist ideology that is being espoused by Orban and 
the Fidesz party as well the far right Jobbik party today have their roots in the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum, the political party that won the elections in 1990 and led the government 
from 1990-94. It’s core base of supporters resided in the Christian and national middle class and 
espoused more nationalistic overtones. In 1993 a group of former MDF lawmakers led by Istvan 
Csurka, the former vice president of the MDF, who spoke disparagingly about the constitutional 
court after it blocked a bill that would have reprivatised land and given it back to the descendents 
of the former peasants who had owned it, broke off and formed a new political party called The 
Hungarian Party of Justice and Life (MIEP). The party’s ideology is built around representing 
Hungarian interests over those seen as foreigners, including bankers, and is anti-capitalistic. 
They also want to purge the government of communist era officials who they view as working 
against Hungarian interests. The party also had grander plans of one day unifying the Hungarian 
people and reclaiming the lands that it sees as being stolen from them in the Treaty of Trianon in 
1920 following WWI. At the time these ideas were seen as too extreme for the MDF and 
therefore they were pushed out of the party or left. The policy positions though have been taken 
up by Fidesz and are evident in certain policies such as Orban granting  native Hungarians who 
are members of living in neighboring countries the right to Hungarian citizenship as well as the 
right to vote in Hungarian elections. It is also seen in the attack on immigrants and civil society 
groups as well as individuals such as George Soros as working against the interests of the 
Hungarian nation. During this time however it was believed that parties such as these were 
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dangerous to the liberal democratic principles that the post-transition era was supposed to have 
brought on and could end up leading to international condemnation if they were allowed to 
remain in the governing party.  
 One other aspect of Hungarian post-communist society has been the lack of a coherent 
civil society to challenge the government. There has been many debates as to what kinds of 
groups constitute civil society, whether they should encompass all groups that fall outside of the 
state like bowling clubs or bird watching groups, or whether they specifically have to do with 
groups that lobby a government on behalf of a certain group or cause. For this paper the term 
civil society means, “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self generating, 
autonomous from the state, and which involves citizens acting collectively in the public sphere to 
express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to achieve collective goals, and to make 
demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold the state 
accountable.”  The reason for the absence of these groups, much like the absence of a large 34
party affiliation, is that the communist regimes made the population join state sponsored 
organizations which imbued a legacy of resentment in the population against having to join 
similar groups once communism had ended.  
Although low levels of civil society activity can correspond with a decline of liberal 
democracy there has been others who have pointed at that a hyperactive civil society in a society 
can lead to a ​decline ​of liberal democracy. This is because if a state is perceived to be ineffectual 
than civil society groups can actually be seen by a population to be more legitimate actors to air 
their grievances to than the actual authorities who are vested with that power. This could lead to 
34 Krause, Deegan Kevin, ​“Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy”, 
(Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland US, 2018) pg. 89 
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a very destabilizing situation where competing authorities are vying for power, as in Weimar 
Germany before the Nazis came to power and could result in civil conflict. It is up to the political 
institutions and political parties themselves to generate trust within the population in their ability 
to bring about positive change. Civil society than, while it can have positive effects such as 
engaging the population in issues that they care about and generating knowledge about certain 
subjects, it is no replacement for concrete political actions taken by a government. 
While that is true a lack of civil society involvement in the population does not 
necessarily mean people are involving themselves in politics and could point to high levels of 
alienation and mistrust which was the case in Hungary. A lack of civil society groups, “Does not 
necessarily mean that post communist democracy is in danger of collapse or breakdown, it also 
ensures that many postcommunist citizens lack the institutional representation and political 
“leverage” that could be provided by active voluntary organizations.”  A generation of 35
Hungarians that have grown up without being exposed to a vibrant civil society have instead 
been found to be increasingly isolated from one another and from the political institutions since 
there are not the same types of groups challenging the government, other than other political 
parties, to represent their interests. That has led to increasing apathy and pessimism among the 
population which has aided the right wing populists. To put that in perspective, in a survey 
conducted in 2011 it was found that, “Excepting contact with neighbors, Hungarians are isolated 
from political life and meaning-58 percent report little interest in politics; a whopping 41 percent 
(three times higher than in other countries) report no interest in solving social problems, an 83 
35 Howard, Marc, Morje. ​“​The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society”​, Journal of Democracy, ​Vol. 13, 
No. 1, January 2002, pg 158 
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percent report that politicians are not interested in their views.”  This poll was taken very soon 36
after Fidesz and Orban came to power a second time and began to take over the checks and 
balances system which had been in place since the transition. These feelings of isolation could 
help explain why there were no real mass demonstrations against Fidesz since its return to 
power, that is concerted efforts to protest the government’s actions.  
Since civil society groups are meant to embody the interests of the people within a certain 
country it can be harmful when a group receives a large amount of outside funding. As happened 
just recently with the closure of the Open Society Foundation’s office in Budapest, as the 
government clamps down on the civil society groups that have emerged it is often with the 
troupe that they were acting on behalf of foreign agents, in that case George Soros, who the 
government claimed was trying to flood the country with immigrants. The government then 
passed a law, dubbed the Stop Soros law, targeting civil society groups that aided asylum seekers 
in order to ensure the continued dominance of country’s ethnic, religious, and cultural character 
that fined organizations deemed to be threatening to that goal, the proposal declared, “ The rate 
of the immigration financing duty is 25% of the financial or property benefit originating abroad. 
If the migration supporting organization fails to meet its duty payment obligations, the tax 
authority may impose a fine that will be equivalent to double the amount of the unpaid duty.”  37
That means that since there is not a robust organizational structure to fundraise from within 
Hungary, those groups would likely have to cease their activities which could put the human 
rights of those asylum seekers already in the country at worse risk due to the discriminatory 
nature of the Hungarian system. It was hoped that the fact that there was such low levels of civil 
36 Andrea Zick, ​Intolerance, Prejudice, and Discrimination: A European Report, ​(Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert 
Stiftung, 2011). 
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activity that it could go both ways, that there be no anti-democratic movements to arise. 
Unfortunately that mantle has been taken up by the government itself, with the complacency of 
the vast majority of the public.  
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Chapter 3: The Rise of the Right Wing and Fidesz under Orban 
 
During the 1998-2002 conservative government led by Fidesz and Viktor Orban the 
political atmosphere became increasingly polarized as Orban sought to create a clear delineation 
between his political party which he likened to more of a movement led by the rightful 
representatives of the Hungarian nation and the opposition, the SZDSZ and the Socialists. There 
was also a turn towards a more personal style of politics in which, “Most people prefer parties 
that transform politics into a visual experience as opposed to those that convey their policies 
using the classic devices of verbal debates and programs. Feelings become more important than a 
conscious understanding and acceptance. These feelings are most accessible through those 
charismatic personalities who communicate the message of the party. The personality that 
conveys the message becomes the message itself”.  ​Orban’s charismatic personality aided him 38
in developing this national narrative that instilled a sense of nationalism and identity into his 
base of supporters and moved away from the consensual style of politics that had prioritized 
pragmatism and expertise as well as cooperation with the opposition parties. The move towards a 
politics based more on personality developed to a certain degree into a religion where Orban was 
not merely a member or the leader of the Fidesz party but was the party. This reliance on a 
charismatic leader is also typical of populist politicians who attempt to create a personality cult 
surrounding them. Following his defeat in the 2002 elections to the Socialists and the SZDSZ 
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Orban declared, “Perhaps, our parties and representatives will be in opposition in the Parliament, 
but we, here in this square, cannot and will not be in opposition, because the nation cannot be in 
opposition.  ​This speech, given to a large group of his supporters in front of Kossuth Lajos 39
square in front of the parliament was meant to further separate Fidesz, the party of the nation, to 
the political parties of the left which were viewed as prioritizing further integration into Europe 
over representing Hungarian interests. The Socialist party in particular was further tied to the 
communist past and was a reminder of the transitionary period which the right did not consider 
to be truly finished due to the fact that many communist civil servants and functionaries still held 
their positions and no one was actually brought to trial or punished for their roles during the 
communist regime.  
 In 2002 Peter Medgyessy, a Socialist politician came to power promising the population 
expanding social welfare benefits including, “salaries of public sector employees (about 800,000 
people) were raised by 50 percent, scholarships and grants by 30 percent, taxes on the minimum 
wage (already raised by Orban in his conservative led government from 1998-2002) were 
abolished and from January 2003 the country’s 3 million pensioners received a thirteenth 
monthly pension”.  These programs, including an expanded highway construction plan, were 40
embarked upon when there was no money to fund them and merely aided in increasing the 
budget deficit. In 2004 Hungary joined the European Union which was widely popular among 
the population as it signified Hungary’s rejoining of the European community after so long under 
communist rule. Also in 2004 as Medgyessy was falling in popularity a new Prime Minister 
39 Speech by Viktor Orban after lost elections. Budapest, May 7, 2002. 
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came to power, Ferenc Gyurcsany, who would do probably the most damage to the standing of 
the socialist/liberal government.  
Arguably the most and definitely the most vivid of his failings was, after the Socialists 
victory in the 2006 elections against Fidesz, Gyurcsany was caught on tape in May of that year 
talking to a conference of other Socialist politicians where he assailed them for lying to the 
public about the benefits promised and of not speaking the truth about the economic 
mismanagement plaguing the country. He implored his party members to agree to economic 
reforms saying “We had almost no other choice (than the package of cuts) because we fucked up. 
Not just a little bit but totally. No other country in Europe has committed such stupidities as we 
have. Obviously we have been lying our heads off for the past one half-two years. You can’t 
name one single important government measure we can be proud of.”  This profanity laced 41
speech was taken and made public after which the prime minister’s credibility was destroyed. 
The “lie speech” as it was called was called was played over and and over by conservative 
politicians who rejoiced in the proof they had of the Socialists duplicity. This also caused in 
increase in attacks by Fidesz and by Orban in particular who questioned the continued legitimacy 
of the government entirely and demanded that the prime minister should step. In a speech in July 
of 2006 Orban stated, “The Gyurcsany package (of budget cuts) is not a democratically elected 
government program but an arbitrary diktat- not legitimate. The government has not right to 
implement the Gyurcsany package.”  This marked the beginning of the erosion of trust that 42
Hungarians had in their own political institutions. By questioning the legitimacy of the 
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government to continue and by using rhetoric that was trying to pit the government as against the 
people Orban was attempting to frame himself as the true representative of the people’s interests.  
A further defeat for the government was in a referendum called by Fidesz in 2008 during 
which the population was asked whether to abolish university fees (about $350) as well as fees 
for visiting the doctor (about $1 per visit). The government, already in a dismal economic 
situation, lost the referendum and the fees were abolished, thereby portraying Fidesz in a positive 
light as lightening the load of the working and middle classes while also taking away another 
revenue source for the government. In 2009 Ferenc Gyurcsany, who had this point had lost the 
complete trust of the population, stepped down in favor of Gordon Bajnai. Bajnai took it upon 
himself to implement a host of austerity measures that sought to ease the country out of the dire 
economic situation that had been exacerbated by the 2008 market crisis that had laid bare the 
Socialist government’s incompetence. The ensuing cuts included “the cancellation of the 
thirteenth monthly salary, the raising of the retirement age from sixty-two to sixty-five, the 
reduction of numerous welfare payments and an increase in VAT (consumption tax on EU goods 
and services) from 20 to 25 percent.”  Although in the long term this was beneficial to the 43
country's economic situation in the short term it destroyed any chance of the left wing alliance 
winning in elections in 2010, and benefited Fidesz even more since it was in their interests for 
the left to institute those changes and take the blame even though most likely they would have 
had to implement some of those measures if Bajnai had not. According to a poll conducted in 
2009, “72 percent of respondents said they had been better off under communism. Only 46 
percent of respondents in the 2009 poll believed that the transition to capitalism after 1989 had 
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been the correct course; in 1991 this figure had been about 80 percent. 74 percent had found the 
multi-party system desirable in 1991, this figure fell by 56 percent by 2009.”  The failure of the 44
free market capitalist economy left people yearning for the predictability of the communist 
system that had at least given people employment and welfare benefits. The benefits of 
globalization and democracy in particular that Hungarians saw in the western European countries 
in the form of increased prosperity were not materializing and allowed the right wing populists 
room to maneuver. They could now lay the failures of the country at the doorsteps of opposition 
parties tied to the communist past who had no concern for the Hungarian middle class, gypsies, 
Jews, multinational companies, and the EU.  
3.1 The Jobbik Party and the Hungarian Far Right. 
 
As stated in the first chapter the beginning of the Hungarian Far Right began with 
Istvan Csurka MIEP (Hungarian Justice and Life) Party, founded in 1993 that espoused a 
anti-globalist, anti-communist ideology that sought to purge the political institutions of any of 
members of the former regime. The party also had a very anti-semitic element to it as they 
derided those groups who they saw as exploiting Hungary’s economic weaknesses following the 
transition. The assumption being that Hungarians were being pushed out of their homeland by 
foreign forces. During the first decade after the transition however these ideologies did not gain 
too much traction with the population. This can be attributed to the technocratic, consensualist 
form government that sought to tie Hungary more closely to the EU to ensure economic 
advancement and a clear desire from the population to allow that process to continue.  
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 The Jobbik party, which translates to Movement for a Better Hungary, was founded in 
2003 following the Socialist-SZDSZ victory in the elections.The party’s ideology centered 
around opposition to the political establishment, both left and right, which they viewed as being 
similar in their approaches to globalism and integration. The party’s economic platform centers 
on economic nationalism, “it rejects free-competition capitalism and evisions a closed national 
market economy restricted to small producers within a national framework. The essence of this 
vision is localism-local self-sustaining economies and societies-instead of globalism”  The 45
effects of multinational corporations entering Hungary had, in their eyes, only benefited a small 
number of people at the very top of the economic ladder who had access to education and 
financial capital. By focusing their efforts on prioritizing Hungarian businesses it was hoped that 
that could increase employment, especially in the rural areas, and maintain a homogeneous 
Hungarian nation. A lot of their rhetoric also focused on the historical wrong’s committed 
against Hungary by outside powers, particularly the Treaty of Trianon which split up ethnic 
Hungarian’s into the surrounding countries and the crimes committed during the Kadar era that 
were never answered for.  
Although founded in 2003 the rapid rise in Jobbik’s popularity only began in 2006 
following the appointment of a new leader, Gabor Vona, and the re-election of the Socialist led 
government. The leaking of the ‘lie speech’ by prime minister Gyurcsany was a major boost for 
Jobbik as well as Fidesz since it decreased trust in the government and the increasingly dire 
position of the Hungarian economy also helped erode what patience was left within the 
population in liberal democracy which was failing in its promise to bring about economic growth 
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in society. The failure of those parties was in not articulating why economic reform was 
necessary to the population and also how it was going to better their lives. 
 The other major issue that Jobbik became well known for is for it’s introduction of the 
term “Gypsy crime” in Hungarian political discourse. In 2006 in a town called Olaszliszka in 
northeast Hungary, a poorer area, a Hungarian teacher swerved to avoid hitting a young Roma 
girl in their car, and although the car didn’t hit her a mob of other Roma individuals arrived, 
including the girls family members, and beat the teacher to death. This contributed to an 
increasing amount of alienation and increased the divide of ‘us versus them’ in Hungarian 
society. Even though Roma are Hungarian citizens, they are a group that are not considered part 
of the Hungarian nation by right wing populists. There perceived laziness and physical 
separation from society made them an easy target to being labelled criminals. The reason for 
those stereotypes, besides that tragic incident was the way in which Roma, who were mostly 
low-skilled workers were hurt by the transition to a market economy, where the unemployment 
rate for them was much higher than in the rest of the population. This has caused increasing 
social stigmatization and has severely hurt their chances for advancement in the economy. It has 
also bred resentment by Roma against the majority of the population. The Socialists and the 
other social democratic parties have been averse to tackling this issue for fear of angering voters. 
The attacks made by Jobbik against welfare given to Roma aim to satisfy their base of supporters 
who do not want their tax money going to perceived shirkers.  
Jobbik, similar to Fidesz, has sought to craft a Hungarian identity that excludes both 
those below, the Roma, the homeless, and those at the top, the political elite, multinational 
companies, and bankers. The typical Jobbik voter is younger, male, not necessarily uneducated, 
44 
and has anxiety over his place in a future society. Jobbik has sought to maximize the fear that 
their future in Hungary is being put in jeopardy by groups either trying to live off the state or 
those that are dictating from the top and are controlling the economy from above, the anti-semitic 
element, and that the only hope lies in banishing both groups from society. This reliance on the 
importance of identity was made in a speech given by Gabor Vona during which he said, “The 
crisis of the economy, the disappearance of public security, the termination of agriculture; the 
agony of domestic businesses; the crippled conditions of employees; the looting by multinational 
banks and capital, the shrinking population; and all the rest of our problems are only affects. The 
cause-the real cause- is the loss of national identity.”  This is the reason why, with the influx of 46
immigrants throughout Europe from Muslim majority countries beginning in 2015, Jobbik could 
lean on this desire to preserve national identity to attract further support. The terrorist attacks that 
accompanied migrants in France, Germany, Belgium, and other Western European countries 
further solidified its point.  
In the 2010 elections Jobbik won 16.67 percent of the vote, only three percentage points 
less than the Socialist party, which indicated an increase willingness from Hungarians to accept 
this far right ideology as part of mainstream politics. In 2014 Jobbik  won 20.02 percent and in 
the most recent parliamentary elections in 2018 Jobbik gained 19 percent, making it the leading 
opposition party to Fidesz. The MSZP party had shrunk to a mere 11 percent in the 2018 
elections and opposition parties that had formed after 2010 had also received between 5-7 
percent each. This has meant that Fidesz has had to react by co-opting several of Jobbik’s views 
regarding migrants and the Roma population by banning immigrants from entering the country 
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and not abiding by EU requirements to accept a quota of migrans to be re-settled. As Fidesz has 
drifted further to the right and has begun to monopolize more and more power in it’s institutions 
Jobbik has targeted Fidesz in terms of the corrupt nature of the way the government is run, that 
oligarchs close to Orban have taken control over much of the media and therefore have a 
monopoly on information given the population. That is one issue on which the left wing 
opposition parties and Jobbik have in common, the desire to get rid of Orban’s tight grip on 
power, although there policy positions certainly clash.  
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Chapter 4: The Fundamental Law- Changes to the Hungarian 
Constitution 
 Following the transition from communism the political parties had adopted the 
Hungarian constitution of 1949 as there basis for revising the new constitution. They need not 
completely redraft a new one due to the fact that at the Opposition Round Table the political 
actors and parties had not been elected yet and the previous Hungarian parliament was no longer 
considered legitimate. The fact that the 1949 constitution had been written at the time under 
Soviet domination made it an issue of deep contestation by the right wing political parties and 
they could look to the document and it’s transitory nature to proclaim that the political transition 
was truly complete. The failure of the political parties to agree on the draft of a new constitution, 
which was close to be completed during the 1994-1998 legislative session can be attributed to 
political infighting and a deterioration of the air of compromise during the initial years of the 
post-communist era. 
After Fidesz’s victory in the 2010 elections with a two-thirds majority in parliament they 
along with their ally the Christian Democratic People’s Party which is basically a satellite party 
used by Fidesz decided to alter the parliamentary procedures in order to more easily control the 
constitution. In 1995 a law was passed that required four-fifths majority to alter the constitution, 
up from two-thirds. That law was changed by Fidesz, as they merely utilized there two-thirds 
majority in order to change the law back to mandating only a two-thirds majority. Coined the 
Fundamental Law the new constitution, which came into effect on January 1,2012 with no 
opposition parliamentary support and very little debate in parliament on the makeup of the draft, 
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this document has completely altered the political system away from liberal democracy and into 
an illiberal democracy ruled by Orban. 
Turning now to the Fundamental Law’s preamble there is an immediate harkoning to 
populist rhetoric that seeks to portray the Hungarian government as the representatives of all true 
Hungarians, “We, the members of the Hungarian Nation, at the beginning of the new millenium, 
with a sense of responsibility for every Hungarian hereby proclaim the following”.  The fact 47
that the preamble doesn’t use the words “republic” or “citizen” is fairly significant. A citizen 
does not have to be tied to any particular ethnic group and citizenship can be attained by a 
number of years residing in one state. Furthermore a nation doesn’t necessarily have to conform 
to any state boundaries and in the preamble the responsibility to every Hungarian is not limited 
to those that are residing within its own borders. The fact that ethnic Hungarians residing in 
neighboring countries ex. Serbia, Ukraine are given the right to vote in Hungarian elections, 
which was only brought about after the 2010 elections reflects what the Fidesz government sees 
as its duty to speak on behalf of all ethnic Hungarians. This is further evident in the Hungarian 
government’s hostility to an education law passed by Ukraine in order to increase the fluency of 
Ukrainian in the country. Following the passage of the law Hungary has held up any discussions 
about a possible entry of Ukraine into NATO as a way of forcing Ukraine to amend the law to 
allow ethnic Hungarians the choice of being taught Hungarian in schools. In a speech Orban 
gave in November 2018 he declared, “We shall make it clear that Ukraine’s path to NATO and 
the European Union can lead through Hungary and Budapest. End of Story.”  That was in direct 48
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relation to the Ukrainian government’s, as Orban calls it, discriminatory policies against 
Hungarians living in Ukraine.  
The term nation is also important in that in blends in a degree of history that is seen in 
later Article D of the constitution explicitly states that, “ There is one single Hungarian Nation 
that belongs together. Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond 
its borders, and shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities; the 
establishment of their community self-governments, and shall promote their cooperation with 
each other and Hungary.”  This article was made in reference to the multiple times in history, 49
but particularly after WWI when the signing of the Treaty at Trianon in 1920 deprived Hungary, 
which was then part of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, of much of its land and millions of its 
citizens who were separated by borders drawn up by the allied victors.  
The fact that the constitution portrays itself as the protector of the Hungarian nation could 
lead credence to the idea that it is opposed to others residing in Hungary who are not a part of 
that nation of acquiring the same rights and privileges accorded in the Fundamental Law. Going 
back to the preamble it states that, “We proclaim that the nationalities living with us form a part 
of the Hungarian political community” . The difference between being a member of the political 50
community and being a member of the nation is that the members of the community aren’t 
necessarily the ones who enacted the constitution since the preamble specifically references the 
Hungarian Nation. This aspect of the constitution therefore could possibly be seen as a way of 
dividing the population into whom the government truly wants to represent and who just happen 
to reside in the geographic area in which they happen to reside. The exclusivity nature of this 
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aspect of the constitution also highlights the way populist rhetoric has managed to find its way 
into the document.  
The religious aspects of the preamble also show the way in which the Fidesz party, since they 
were the party who could by themselves change the constitution, chose to view the Hungarian 
nation. It states, “We recognize the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood. We value the 
various religious traditions of our country. We honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the 
constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and unity of the nation.”  This move towards 51
solely Christian values, although most of the population is predominantly Christian, excludes 
those who might not be a part of that faith. As is being witnessed by the influx of Muslim 
refugees into Europe Fidesz has taken it upon themselves to decide who is truly worthy of being 
a member of the nation and to formulate, by themselves, what a Hungarian should be and who 
should encompass it. 
The Orban government have used their broad constitutional powers in order to shape the 
political landscape in which they operate. They do this in direct violation of the norms of liberal 
democracy which are that  people from different cultural and political communities can co-exist 
next to each other peacefully. One of the ways in which Orban has done this is through his 
co-option of the constitutional court which since its formation after the fall of communism had 
been very active in reaching decisions on laws that were passed in parliament. To Orban the 
court represented a clear challenge to his desire to implement changes that he believed were the 
responsibility of Fidesz since they had won a clear ⅔’s majority and therefore had a clear 
mandate to operate independently of any checks to their power.  The broad powers that were 
51 Hungary’s constitution 2011 
50 
given to the court in the early years of democracy are indicative of a desire to be seen, especially 
by the European community, as a country that respected the rule of law and of checks and 
balances.To weaken the court  Orban would have to minimize the court’s purview over the 
legislative process. 
To do this Orban went about deconstructing the powers the court had from within. Before 
being placed on the court judges had to be nominated by a majority of the parties that were 
present in parliament. Now with the ⅔’s majority in parliament the role of the oppositional 
parties was curtailed since Fidesz could nominate them on their own. Furthermore, “in order to 
achieve a pro-government majority on the court bench as quickly as possible, the prime minister 
increased the number of justices from eleven to fifteen. Their period of office was raised from 
nine to twelve years.”  By enabling the introduction of allies on the court for such lengthy 52
periods of time gave the possibility that they would be in place long after any new parliamentary 
majority would be brought to power thereby solidifying Fidesz control over the long term. At 
face value this could potentially be seen to mirror the US Supreme Court nominee process, 
whereby a candidate merely needs a 50 vote majority in the senate to be sworn in for life which 
gives a huge advantage to whichever party controls the senate. However judges in the US are 
subjected a lengthy review process by the opposition party, face intense scrutiny, and are 
expected not to be beholden to any political party. The court packing that Orban instituted is 
similar to what Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to do during the great depression in order to 
pass his sweeping economic changes. That attempt was halted in the Congress. The Hungarian 
parliament has been unable since 2010 to influence much of anything since Orban has 
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maintained his ⅔’s majority and sidelined the opposition parties into irrelevance. The 
government also mandated the compulsory retirement of all judges who had reached the age of 
62, which affected a total of 274 judges. This gave Fidesz a large advantage in being able to 
name judges at will who would be loyal to them and would in all likelihood vote in favor of 
views held by Fidesz if a group of parties managed to increase their vote share in order to reduce 
Fidesz influence. A similar bill was passed by the Law and Justice party in Poland this year that 
lowered the age of retirement and necessitated the removal of judges who had not yet completed 
their terms. These attacks on the independence of the judiciary are the result of part of the ruling 
party’s attempt to rule single handedly, using their victory in parliamentary elections, to rule 
without oversight.  
The court was also weakened in what it could rule on. Following a decision in October 
2010 where the constitutional court found that parliament could not retroactively tax the 
compensation of  state employees by 98 percent the parliament passed a constitutional 
amendment that stipulated that “the jurisdiction of the constitutional court was limited so that the 
justices could no longer review fiscal laws. By making it nearly impossible for the Court to 
second-guess budget and tax policy, the Fidesz government could act in the financial arena 
without having to pay attention to the usual constitutional constraints.”  By consolidating 53
control of state finances within the party, Fidesz is preventing any sort of discussion regarding 
where money should be flowing with regards to infrastructure, energy, as well social security 
benefits to the population. It is also severely hamperning a large majority of the country who did 
not vote for Fidesz. The person whose responsibility to choose the judges, the head of the 
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National Judicial Office, is likewise chosen by a ⅔’s majority for another nine year term. The 
increasing vacancies made available by the forced retirement of hundreds of judges mean that all 
all new judges will likely be Fidesz party loyalists or eventually be pressured into ruling in their 
favor. According to a further amendment, The Act on the Transitional Provisions of the 
Fundamental Law, “allows both the head of the National Judicial Office and the chief prosecutor 
to assign specific cases to specific courts according to their assessment of the relative workloads 
of these courts.”  Being allowed to merely choose which courts hear which cases is a further 54
mockery of the judicial system and also serves to make them impotent to political interference 
that will decide which way cases sway before a verdict is officially issued. The previous work of 
the court was also undermined when in March 2013, “ The fourth amendment to the Hungarian 
Fundamental Law means that any violation of the constitution identified as such by the 
constitutional court can have no practical consequences if the government simply incorporates 
the controversial law into the constitution by means of its two-thirds voting machine.”  The 55
power of the courts have progressively been degraded to the point where it is illusory. The 
possession of the ⅔’s majority is tantamount to rule by decree and even if a grouping of 
opposition parties were able to defeat Fidesz majority in 2022 it would have to face a 
antagonistic party apparatus that has encompassed all areas of government and institutions.  
 
 
  
 
Conclusion: Why Hungary Matters. 
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Hungary, a landlocked nation with about ten million people, would not at first 
glance be thought of as very important on the world stage. It has lost much of it’s geo-strategic 
significance since the end of the Cold War and receives relatively scant attention by the world’s 
press. However, Hungary does matter greatly due to the current threat it poses to the liberal 
democratic order that was created at the end of the second world war and was thought to reign 
dominant following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since communism had proved to be 
unsustainable economically as well as politically there wasn’t any other ideology, it was 
believed, that could challenge democracy. That has changed since the introduction of illiberal 
democracy and leaders like Orban who have directly challenged the usefulness and necessity of 
adopting liberal democratic norms and practices as well upholding the values of human rights 
and the rule of law. This illiberal approach as seeped into other political parties all over Europe 
and indeed, all over the world.  Jarosław Jaczyński, the leader of the governing Law and Justice 
Party in Poland, has begun to adopt some of Orban’s tactics such as mandating early retirement 
of judges to get rid of a check on his power. Matteo Salvini, leader of the anti-immigrant League 
party in Italy has come to power in this wave of right wing populism. 
One of the most important lessons that can be taken from the rise of Viktor Orban and 
Fidesz is that liberal democracy is never guaranteed and that right wing populism is a permanent 
fixture of any democratic country due to democracy’s embrace of pluralism. The only solution to 
this problem is through effective governing and addressing the needs of the population by 
reducing inequality and providing opportunities to the population to reduce the allure of 
populists who seek to overturn the system. When Orban came to power in 2010 he was elected 
democratically, through a system that had managed to maintain the checks and balances system 
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for the past twenty years. There was also no waves of migrants streaming over the borders for 
Orban to scare the population with. Instead he was elected because the previous Socialist-Liberal 
government had lost its legitimacy due to poor economic policies, the realization that they had 
openly lied to the population and could not deliver on the promises they had made to the people 
during the elections. This not only undermined the trust in the government and the political 
system in general, but when Orban did begin the process of monopolizing control over the 
countries judicial and legislative branches of government there was no sustained protest 
movement on the part of the population and there was no effective resistance from a 
disorganized and fragmented opposition which had been tainted by scandals. The path Hungary 
has gone down should be a wake up call to other countries, especially those post-communist 
countries who have seen a rise in right wing populism in the past few years, that without 
effective governance that speaks to the needs of the population political parties that advocate for 
greater pluralism, globalization and human rights could find themselves on the defensive and 
without sustained political activism on the part of the population it could be that illiberal regimes 
could be set up in other countries as well. 
At the moment, Hungary’s future as a democratic state looks very bleak. After elections 
in April 2018 where Fidesz again won a ⅔’s majority of seats it doesn’t look like there will be a 
change in the political system anytime soon. The opposition parties, divided and fractious, are 
unlikely to be able to mount a significant campaign against him. The EU has similarly been 
hobbled in it’s response to Orban’s rise.The EPP (European People’s Party) in the European 
Parliament, which Fidesz belongs to, has suspended Fidesz due to the deteriorating political 
situation and a smear campaign against the current President of the EU commision Jean Claude 
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Juncker (who at a EU meeting called Orban a dictator and slapped him on the face) but has not 
kicked the party out and has importantly allowed Fidesz MP’s to  remain in place so that they 
can add to the EPP’s majority come the European Parliamentary elections this May. Interestingly 
enough a group of right wing populists parties, including Italy’s League and Germany’s 
Alternative for Germany, have formed a new party called the European Alliance for People’s and 
Nations. It remains to be seen whether or not this new political party will include Fidesz, at the 
moment they are still in the EPP. If they do join it is unlikely that this new party, which has 
similar nationalistic ideologies to Orban, will seek to moderate his behavior. Even if the EU 
sought to punish Hungary by taking away its voting rights in the bloc under Article 7 of the EU 
charter it would need unanimous approval by all other members states. That is not likely to 
happen either due to Poland declaring it will stand by Hungary and vote against any such 
measure.  
The issue that makes Hungary unique was that there was never a push from society as a 
whole in favor of liberal democracy unlike in Poland and the then Czechoslovakia which means 
that Hungarians were never attached to it the same ways other countries have become. 
Democracy legitimacy was never based on political freedom but on the economic prosperity in 
could bring.  Therefore the ability of other leaders to emulate how Orban has gone about 
constructing this illiberal democracy will be limited by their population’s degree of respect and 
want for democratic institutions to be a check on the power of the executive. This does mean that 
those countries might not one day become illiberal democracies but that Hungary has unique 
social and cultural aspects that made it even more susceptible to right wing populists.  
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The hope of Hungary moving away from illiberal democracy rests mainly on the 
shoulders of the Hungarian people themselves, as moves by external actors to punish Hungary, 
already difficult, for it’s behavior would fit the narrative that Orban has been spreading about 
being under siege by supranational institutions that seek to interfere in Hungary’s internal affairs. 
The weak state of civil society as well the government’s moves to weaken it and the overall 
pessimistic nature of Hungarian culture, as well as general feelings of distrust will make any 
concerted grassroots activism difficult.The option for younger Hungarian’s who may not agree 
with the political direction their country is moving in to move freely within the EU to find 
employment already decreases the impetus to advocate for change. One potential reason to be 
cautiously optimistic however is that the personalistic rule that Orban has cultivated over the past 
decade in power is mainly centered around himself. If he was to be removed it is possible the 
population will refuse to accept the promises of his corrupt political system filled with his 
cronies. Increasing unemployment and an economic crisis could also cause an outbreak of anger 
towards the government. However getting rid of Orban and Fidesz in the parliamentary majority 
would just be the first step, next would come the dismantling the system of oligarchs and Fidesz 
domination of the institutions such as the judiciary and the press, which could take significantly 
longer due to the placement of his loyalists in top positions that range from between 9-12 years. 
Would automatically removing them be the right course of action given that Fidesz, when they 
nominated them was elected democratically? Or would it be a just course given that Fidesz likely 
put those people there to impede the ability of an opposition government to govern effectively? 
Importantly, getting rid of Orban will not automatically inspire a desire for liberal democracy 
among the population and will require a massive and long term effort over a course of decades to 
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convince the people of the benefits of liberal democracy and clear articulation of liberal 
democratica values. That will take time, and at the moment, seems a very distant goal.   
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